India is a nuclear weapon state outside of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. As of the end of 2014, its nuclear arsenal is estimated to include 110-120 warheads.
India's stockpile of fissile materials is estimated to include 3.2 ± 0.9 tonnes of HEU, 0.59 ±0 .18 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium, and 5.5±0.4 tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium, that includes 5.1±0.4 of material considered strategic reserve and 0.4 tonnes of safeguarded plutonium.
India continues to produce fissile materials for weapons. It operates a plutonium production reactor, Dhruva, and a uranium enrichment facility that are not subject to IAEA safeguards.
India's uranium enrichment program is believed to be oriented primarily toward production of HEU for the nuclear submarine program. A pilot-scale enrichment plant in the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) was reported to begin operations in 1985. A larger centrifuge plant, officially known as the Rare Materials Project, reportedly has been operating at Rattehalli in southern India since 1990. The Rattehalli plant is being expanded. Also, India is planning to build an enrichment facility at Chitradurga that will be used for civilian applications.
The HEU produced by India is assumed to be enriched to between 30 percent and 45 percent uranium-235. Assuming an enrichment level of 30 percent, India is estimated to have a stockpile of 3.2 ± 1.1 tons of HEU as of the end of 2014 with a uranium-235 content of 1.0 ± 0.3 tons.
India's weapon-grade plutonium has been produced in two reactors: the 40 MWt CIRUS and the 100 MWt Dhruva, both located in the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) complex near Mumbai. CIRUS was shut down in 2010. Dhruva, commissioned in 1985, continues to operate. India reportedly has plans to build a new 100 MWt reactor in Vizag, Andhra Pradesh.
The total amount of weapon-grade plutonium in India's stockpile is estimated to be 0.59 ± 0.2 tonnes as of the end of 2014.
In addition to the weapon-grade plutonium, India's current stockpile includes an estiamted 5.1 ± 3.0 tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium separated from unsafeguarded heavy-water power reactors. This material is considered a strategic stockpile that could be used for producing unsafeguarded plutonium int he future. It is accounted for as miltiary material. About 2 tonnes of plutonium may have been fabricated into fuel for the Fast Breeder Test Reactor and for the first core of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor which is under construction.
India has an estimated 0.4 tonnes of plutonium has been separated from the spent fuel of safeguarded PHWRs. This material is under safeguards and is accounted for as civilian plutonium.