Under an agreement between the State of Idaho and the U.S. government, reached in 1995, U.S. Navy provides the state with information about naval spent fuel shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory. The table below contains the annual data as compiled by the Snake River Alliance and made available to IPFM.
U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced successful removal of "the last known HEU from Nigeria." The material, "more than 1 kg" of HEU, was supplied to the NIRR-1 research reactor by China. It was returned to the country of origin. A miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR), NIRR-1 is operated by the Center for Energy Research and Training (CERT) at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. It was converted to LEU fuel in October 2018.
The NIRR-1 reactor conversion and removal of HEU from Nigeria is part of the effort to convert MNSR reactors to LEU. In 2016 China converted one of its MNSR reactors, MNSR IAE in Beijing. In 2017, it helped convert the GHARR-1 reactor in Ghana. HEU was removed from Ghana in August 2017. Chinese-origin MNSR reactors that use HEU fuel are located in Pakistan and Syria. China operates an HEU MNSR reactor in Shenzhen University.
Nigeria became the 34 country plus Taiwan that had all their HEU removed (NNSA counts 33 countries plus Taiwan, but its count does not include Iraq).
by Greg Mello
The US Department of Energy (DOE)'s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) recommended strategy for resuming industrial-scale production of plutonium pits for nuclear weapons remains uncertain - more so than 6 months ago.
Congressional defense committees did not fully accept the NNSA-Department of Defense (DoD) strategy and wrote new requirements. Appropriations committees questioned NNSA's plan to use pits from the first decade's production in a new warhead. The Senate required an unclassified review of pit lifetimes. At least five new studies bearing on pit production are underway or pending, with completion dates ranging to early 2020.
NNSA's 2017 Plutonium Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and its 2018 Plutonium Pit Production Engineering Assessment (EA) both warned that construction and operation of an 80 pit-per-year (ppy) capability by 2030 would be difficult. Congress has yet to grapple with the engineering issues raised in those two reports.
Pit production in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
Section 3120 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), added to the bill in a floor amendment (pp. 12, 232) sponsored by the combined New Mexico delegation, modified and delayed NNSA's industrial-scale pit strategy by:
- Making Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the "Plutonium Science and Production Center of Excellence" (emphasis added) for the US. The latter is a new and challenging mission for LANL, which has struggled to keep its limited pit capabilities operating.
- Requiring NNSA to "implement surge efforts [at LANL] to exceed 30 ppy to meet Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] and [unstated] national policy." NNSA's AoA and EA warn in strong terms of the risks to other plutonium programs sharing the same LANL facility that are inherent in attempting to push LANL production beyond 30 ppy, for example with multiple labor shifts, in the absence of new facilities.
- Requiring a new study on pit production strategies (p. 658), the third in as many years, to be managed by the Pentagon (instead of NNSA, though in coordination) and conducted by a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). No investment in lasting production scaled to the current stockpile can occur until the results of this study have been reviewed by Congress and the Administration and subsequently incorporated into plans and budgets.
- The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has been chosen to do this review (as well as a parallel review for NNSA required by the Senate Energy and Water Development (EWD) Appropriations Report; see p. 103). The review must assess the risks and benefits of the four EA options, as well as review the prior AoA. It must assess NNSA's proposed methods to reduce risks. It must include review of a strategy to manufacture "up to 80 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory through the use of multiple labor shifts and additional equipment at PF-4 [Plutonium Facility Building 4 in Technical Area 55] until modular facilities are completed to provide a long-term, single shift capacity." NNSA's two studies did not support either a surge or modular LANL facilities (AoA Executive Summary p. 2; EA Congressional Briefing, slide 12).
- Requiring NNSA to assess possible conflict between industrial pit production and LANL's other plutonium missions, including processing of 26 metric tons of surplus pits to produce plutonium dioxide for disposal. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is to review NNSA's assessment.
- Requiring NNSA to produce two detailed plans for pit production at LANL, one for production of 30 ppy by 2026, the other for "designing and carrying out production of plutonium pits 31-80" by 2030 in case the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, is not "operational and producing pits" by then, a challenging deadline, especially at LANL (AoA Executive Summary p. 2; EA Congressional Briefing, slides 8-9); and by
- Requiring the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to annually certify that the plan to produce 80 ppy by 2030 is "on track," and requiring NNSA to produce "either a concurrent backup plan or a recovery plan" to get back on schedule if certification is not forthcoming.
New study on plutonium aging and the lifetime of plutonium pits
The FY2019 Senate EWD Report (p. 104) requires NNSA to contract with the JASON defense analysis group for another study, this one to assess
... plutonium aging and the lifetime of plutonium pits in nuclear weapons.... Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this act [i.e. by March 2020], the Administrator shall submit to Congress a report on the findings...[including] recommendations...for improving the knowledge, understanding, and application of the fundamental and applied sciences related to the study of plutonium aging and pit lifetimes, an estimate of minimum and likely lifetimes for pits in current warheads, and the feasibility of reusing pits in modified nuclear weapons. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
Appropriations committee reports, while not statutory law, are treated "almost as seriously" (p. 1). In cases where one committee's report language is acceptable to both committees, the conference report may be silent "due to an expectation that the agency will follow the original directive." (p. 5) Such is the case here.
This will be the first unclassified assessment of pit lifetimes since the 2008 joint DoD-DOE appraisal that stated that the minimum pit lifetime was "85-100 years" from manufacture.
According to congressional sources, NNSA is meanwhile nearing completion of a classified in-house study of pit aging, conducted by NNSA's Defense Programs Advisory Committee (DPAC).
Pits, interoperable warheads and Life Extension Programs
The near-term requirement for new pits is also being questioned indirectly, by questioning the only warhead that needs them. NNSA's FY2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) of October 2018 does not include interoperable warheads (IWs) except as studies (pp. 2-13, 14), continuing the Trump Administration's Nuclear Posture Review policy (p. 61) of terminating the Obama Administration's IW1 program in favor of a W78 Life Extension Program (LEP).
IW1 was NNSA's only pre-2040 warhead program that required new pits. IW1 began in FY2013-14 (p. 8-36) but has been on hold since then, in part due to strong Navy disinterest. The proposed W78 LEP would, like IW1, use new pits (p. 2-13) to accommodate insensitive high explosive (IHE). A "W78 LEP" with "all newly manufactured components" is simply the Air Force portion of the IW1. Sources say it may soon be called the "W87-1."
Like the IW1 (p. 10), the new-pit W78 LEP would be based on the W87 and use a "W87-like" pit. The W87 is the only ballistic-missile warhead with IHE, and the Plutonium Sustainment program has been solely focused (p. 2-30) on producing "W87-like" pits in the 2020s. The new-pit W78 LEP plan assumes adequate availability of such pits for first W78 production in FY2030 (p. 4-42).
[T]he NNSA is directed to provide to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress, not later than 60 days after the enactment of this Act and prior to commencement of phase 6.2, a report that provides the rationale for an insensitive-high explosive (IHE)-based system, an updated estimate of the cost and schedule for warhead development and production, and a rough order of magnitude cost and schedule comparison of the differences between the requested IW and a W76 LEP-like refurbishment of the W78 [i.e. a W78 LEP without IHE and a new pit]. Further, the NNSA shall initiate an independent review by the Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) of the analysis of alternatives process conducted as part of the life extension study of the W78 to assess objectivity, thoroughness, and adherence to the Government Accountability Office recommended best practices, in accordance with current NNSA policy.
Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the NNSA shall provide to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress a report that includes the following: (1) the results of the CEPE review; (2) a cost and schedule estimate to refurbish the W78 warhead in a manner similar to the W76 LEP; (3) a cost estimate for any needed upgrades to Department of Defense facilities to fully satisfy safety requirements for handling conventional high explosives; (4) impacts to the IW/W78 LEP if pit production targets are not met; and (5) the certification strategy for the IW/W78 LEP that addresses issues raised by the JASONs group in its review of certification risks for an IW with IHE and remanufactured pits.
The "issues raised by the JASONs" included warnings that: a) warhead modifications to incorporate IHE "may force a reduction in design yield margins" (p. 6), and b) certification of the nuclear explosive package (NEP) as well as of the reentry vehicle [RV] could be difficult. Sources suggest that dozens of flight tests could be required to determine the accuracy of the modified RV.
Given the technical risks, schedule challenges, and great expense (estimated by NNSA at $19.5 billion, including $4.4 billion in DoD costs, plus pit production) (p. 4-42), and the risk to NNSA's plutonium facilities and programs entailed by "surge" production in old facilities, the W78 "new pit option" may not survive. Of note, the majority of warheads in the US arsenal - those deployed by the Navy - will continue to use conventional high explosive for at least the next 25 years.
Another option is to retire the W78. As the JASONs note (p. 5), "multiple diverse designs that meet the same requirements provide little benefit over a single high-confidence design," in this case the existing W87. Another option is to retire some or all US ground-based ballistic missiles.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is completing a review of the IW1/W78 LEP program pursuant to July 2017 requirement (p. 360). GAO will issue a report this fall reviewing NNSA's IW1/W78 LEP planning and management, including infrastructure, equipment, and personnel.
Funding and setting pit production requirements
Congress did provide ample funding for pit production. The final EWD bill funds the "Plutonium Sustainment" budget line at the requested level ($361 million), a 71% increase over FY2018 spending and the first step in what the administration proposes (pp. 60, 63) to be a dramatic ramp-up to $1.2 billion per year by 2023.
Within this budget, the Conference directs NNSA to break out a "Plutonium Pit Production Project," (pp. 165-166, 178), and funds this new project for FY2019 at $75 million. This structure aims at greater accountability for what is already a large program.
The "mission need" - "Critical Decision Zero" (CD-0) in Department of Energy (DOE) parlance - for "50-80" ppy pit production was approved on 25 November 2015. In June 2017, the Mission Need Statement (MNS) and Program Requirements Document (PRD) prepared in support of CD-0 approval were "updated" (p.3) to reflect a new requirement of at least 80 ppy.
Pit production desires have changed several times over the past 15 years.
Also in June 2017, perhaps in the CD-0, the NNSA Program Secretarial Officer - in this case, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs - formally determined (p. 76) that continuing to rely on PF-4 for enduring pit production capability presented "unacceptably high mission risk" for two reasons: a) efforts to install equipment in PF-4 beyond what is already planned under the Plutonium Sustainment program present unacceptably high risks to achieving 30 ppy production by 2026; and b) PF-4 is much smaller than is required for stockpile pit production, even if missions such as plutonium dioxide production and plutonium-238 manufacturing were somehow relocated. Both the AoA (p. 36, footnote 13; pp. 47-48) and EA (p. 2-54) emphasize the age and operational fragility of PF-4.
CD-1 ("Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range"), which requires many prior studies (pp. A-6 through A-8), is not expected until December 2019 (p. 3-17), assuming NNSA had made a decision as to its overall pit production strategy by the end of FY2018. But NNSA did not. The agency made a recommendation in May, and Congress intervened.
The Senate Appropriations Committee barred (p. 103) NNSA from beginning conceptual design to implement its two-site pit production strategy at Los Alamos and Savannah River until an FFRDC was under contract to review the pit strategy. That review contract began no earlier than September 21, when the bill containing EWD appropriations became law. The IDA team conducting the pit strategy review for DoD told the author in November 2018 they were also doing the review for NNSA. The review for NNSA is due 210 days after enactment (p. 103), i.e. April 19, 2019, four days after the similar DoD review is due on The Hill.
Unless for some reason these reports are delivered early, NNSA cannot make an alternative selection for pit production until sometime after April 2019. Congress will use the reports it requested, along with other information, to fashion FY2020 authorizations and appropriations. The future of the IW1/W78 LEP/W87-1 warhead, as well as anticipation of an updated JASON review on pit aging, may influence congressional and subsequent NNSA decisions - including regarding mission need.
Environmental impact statement
NNSA must also vet the environmental impacts of all reasonable pit production alternatives under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) prior to undertaking actions that prejudice the agency's decision or irreversibly commit resources (general overview in this context, p. 28). The Los Alamos Study Group (LASG) wrote NNSA in April 2018 pointing out that any proposed NNSA decision to produce pits at any site besides LANL, and at LANL at a rate exceeding 20 ppy, would contravene prior decisions and exceed the parameters of prior analysis, requiring an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Any contemplated decision to produce more than 50 ppy at LANL, or a contemplated decision to produce pits at any site other than LANL, would require a Programmatic EIS (PEIS).
Subsequently three other organizations - Tri-Valley CAREs (TVC), Nuclear Watch of New Mexico (NWNM), and Savannah River Site Watch (SRSW) - wrote NNSA and congressional parties making similar and further points, in particular pointing to a legal settlement (in which LASG and TVC were parties) in which DOE agreed to produce a Supplemental PEIS (SPEIS) prior to proceeding to "detailed engineering design" (p. S-2) for any proposal to produce pits at a rate greater than 50 ppy under "routine" (single-shift) circumstances. That is the case (pp. 3, 13) for the present proposal. NNSA began such an SPEIS in 2003 but never completed it. The EA critical path analyses (appendices I-L) would begin "detailed engineering design" as soon as FY2019.
Pits, the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and LANL
In line with the results of the AoA and EA analyses, NNSA's May 10 recommendation was that the bulk of post-2029 pit production should occur at a repurposed MFFF. In that regard, appropriations conferees slashed (p. 181) FY2019 MFFF construction funding by more than one-third from FY2018, from $335 million to $220 million. The latter was the amount requested by the administration to continue orderly project termination (p. 524), to conclude in FY2021.
On October 9, NNSA's plan to terminate the MOX plant was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. At least 600 MOX employees, about one-third of the workforce, will be laid off on 7 January 2019, with the rest to follow on an as-yet-unspecified schedule.
For all their differences, both the AoA (p. 9) and the EA (p. 8) found that refurbishing MFFF was NNSA's least capital-cost, fastest, and in the EA, least-risk option for stockpile pit production by 2030 and thereafter. Neither recommended building underground production "modules" at LANL, the strategy endorsed by the NWC in 2014 and retained for special study in the new NDAA despite these two analyses, as noted above. Neither study recommended building any new facilities at LANL that would be dependent on PF-4. Both acknowledged in different ways that PF-4 was fragile, with a limited life. The EA recommendation did not include any LANL construction (p. 12).
In the AoA, attempts to achieve multi-shift production at LANL were deemed too risky to retain for further analysis (text above; p. 76). The EA (p. 8, summary; pp. 4-22, 23, details) gave the alternative requiring multi-shift operations in PF-4 the highest risk, in part for that reason.
Taking these results on board, it seems NNSA has no viable options for significant stockpile pit production in the 2020s, and almost certainly cannot meet its 2030 deadline for an operational 80 ppy capability.
by Martin Forwood
The UK government announced on 14 November 2018 that the THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield has started its planned shutdown.
A Sellafield Stakeholder committee was told that by 11 November 2018, THORP would have chopped up (sheared) its last batch of spent fuel, bringing to an end almost a quarter century of operation.
Based on the officially published 'annual throughput' figures (tons reprocessed per year) collated by the environmental group Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE) since the plant opened in 1994, THORP has failed to meet its operational targets and schedules by a large margin.
Target: 'THORP will reprocess 7,000 tons of fuel in the first 10 years of operation at a rate of 1,000 tons per year'
Just 5,045 tons were reprocessed in the first 10 years of operation--the 7,000 tons only being completed on 4 December 4 2012--over nine years late. Not once during the Baseload period (1994-2003) was the nominal throughput rate of 1,000 tons per year achieved.
Target: 'THORP will reprocess 800 tons per year during the Post-Baseload period (2004 onwards)'
Whilst the Baseload performance (above) strongly suggested that achieving this rate was highly improbable if not impossible, any chance was finally dashed by THORP's 2005 accident whose irreparable damage slashed the plant's future throughput rate by some 50 percent. Since its restart in 2007 THORP has averaged 306 t/yr.
Target: 'Additional business for THORP is expected to be secured from overseas customers'.
No such business was ever secured. Conversely, over 850 tons of business was lost when, under a revised Atomic Law, German utilities chose--for economic and environmental reasons--to store their fuel in Germany rather than send it to THORP for reprocessing. On its opening in 1994, THORP had secured 10,229 tons of reprocessing business from the UK, Japan and six European countries. On its closure in 2018, the plant will have reprocessed a total of just 9,300 tons 'with all contracts completed.'
Target: 'THORP: a world leading facility for the recycling of used nuclear fuel'
THORP was not designed to recycle spent fuel but to recover materials for subsequent re-use. Of these, the most problematic is plutonium--with a majority of the estimated 56 tons recovered by THORP now languishing unused in the Sellafield stockpile, including plutonium 'flag-swapped' to the UK ownership by overseas customers who have also no use for it.
That THORP was indeed to lose some overseas contracts will have come as no surprise to BNFL whose Director Alan Johnson warned in 1989 (5 years before the plant opened) that the global change in attitude to reprocessing posed a very real threat to THORP and that 'one or two of our important customers would love to cancel their contracts' [Channel 4 1989 TV Documentary 'Inside Sellafield'].
The loss of major overseas business (at least 850 tons worth) will have impacted on THORP's financial viability. BNFL's claim of a £500 million profit being earned over the first 10-year Baseload period was based on a forecast income of £6 billion and (with decommissioning costs accounted for) operational costs of £5.5 billion. The latter have inevitably escalated as a result of the numerous accidents, equipment failures, unplanned events and unscheduled outages suffered by THORP during those first 10 years. Under certain contracts, many such costs could not be foisted upon customers. In addition, the plant's decommissioning cost--put by BNFL in 1990 at an 'undiscounted' £700 million--has ballooned today to an 'undiscounted' £3.7 billion [NDA FoI response to CORE 29.10.18], thus raising further major doubts about THORP's profitability.
The full impact of these failures on THORP's profitability will however only be determined by the publication of a final 'set of accounts' for the plant. To date, no such figures have been published since the plant opened in 1994. The final account is going to be a long time in coming for, in its FoI response to CORE, the NDA confirms that it 'does not intend to make the financial information available at this time and have no plans for future publication. Ongoing commercial contracts make this information commercially sensitive'.
A new report by Michael Schoeppner (PDF file) assesses how the radioactive noble gas krypton-85 in the atmosphere could be used for monitoring the covert reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to separate out plutonium for a nuclear weapon program. Krypton-85 is a fission product and is released when spent fuel is being reprocessed.
Case studies of the reprocessing plants at Dimona in Israel and at Yongbyon in North Korea show that for either of these sites two or three down-wind krypton-85 monitoring stations located in the most frequent wind directions would be sufficient to monitor and verify a shutdown of reprocessing activities. It appears on the order of 50 random air samples taken over an area of 10 million square kilometers (roughly the size of the China or the United States) could detect significant clandestine reprocessing activities within the time it takes to separate a quantity of plutonium considered sufficient by the International Atomic Energy Agency to build a first generation nuclear weapon.
The krypton-85 releases from a small scale facility would be hard to detect because of the accumulated atmospheric background due to large scale reprocessing for military and civilian purposes in a handful of countries around the world and local fluctuations due to on-going reprocessing. Reducing the krypton-85 background in the atmosphere by ending civilian reprocessing would dramatically improve the effectiveness of detection of clandestine reprocessing.
The report concludes that ending reprocessing for any purpose should therefore be seen as a step towards improving global nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament verification.
Michael Schoeppner is a researcher at the Institute of Safety/Security and Risk Sciences in Vienna, and was a post-doctoral researcher at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security.
Thermo Fisher Scientific, a company based in San Diego, CA requested a license to export a small amount of HEU to the United Arab Emirates. The material is used in neutron flux monitoring system supplied by the company. The license request XSNM3806 covers 0.152 kg of HEU containing 0.143 kg of uranium-235 (stated maximum enrichment 94%). The request XSNM3805 (earlier version) is for spares containing 0.047 kg of HEU (0.045 kg of U-235).
The United States will down-blend 20.2 tons of highly-enriched uranium to use the resulting LEU in reactors of the Tennessee Valley Authority that produce tritium for the U.S. nuclear weapon program. The cost of the six-year contract, awarded to Nuclear Fuel Services, a subsidiary of BWX Technology, is $505 million, the work is expected to begin in 2019.
According to the current plans (as outlined in the DoE FY2019 budget request, p. 461) the United States will complete down-blending of 162 MT of surplus HEU in FY2019; 159.7 tons had been down-blended already. The 20.2 tons of HEU will not come from the surplus HEU, however, since the production of tritium requires unobligated HEU. It is not clear, however, why the down-blending is necessary as DOE's 2015 report to Congress, Tritium and Enriched Uranium Management Plan Through 2060 identified sources of enough LEU to fuel the Tennessee Valley Authority reactors until about 2040. The DoE also considers developing centrifuge technology that could be used to produce unobligated LEU. Down-blending of the existing HEU stock, however, would be a viable alternative to building a new enrichment plant.
The United Nations has released the report of the 25-country high-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group. The group was tasked with making recommendations on substantial elements of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, a long-standing, if equally long neglected goal of the international community.
The group was established in 2016 (pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 71/259) and met over the 2017-2018 timeframe under the chairmanship of Ambassador Heidi Hulan of Canada. The report was agreed unanimously by the group at its final meeting on June 8, 2018.
The group had members, most of whom were diplomats, representing Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Senegal, Sweden, and the United States of America.
The preparatory group was a sort of sequel to an earlier UN Group of Governmental Experts that examined the same issues relevant to an eventual FMCT and which had issued a consensus report in 2015. Despite the explicit intention to build-on, but not duplicate the 2015 report, the underlying differences amongst states and the closed-door discussions of the group (that offered no incentive to compromise on preferred positions), yielded a similar "menu" of possible treaty elements without narrowing the range of these options.
The report noted as one possibility that "the structure of the treaty could be established so as to enable the entry into force of an initial framework or umbrella treaty, with two or more protocols to be negotiated subsequently, including according to a specific timeframe."
It concluded that given the various possibilities for the scope and structure of an FMCT, "further work is needed to elaborate the various verification regime models to determine how they might work in practice. Similarly, additional work could usefully be done to assess the resource implications of the possible verification and institutional models."
The group's recommendation that "The negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons ...begin without delay in the Conference on Disarmament," seemed at best an exercise in wishful thinking given the moribund state of this diplomatic forum.
To make progress, concerned states will need to engage in some creative diplomacy that would actually result in the initiation of negotiations of an FMCT in a multilateral forum not subject to veto by any one state.
Options for how this might best be achieved include a United Nations General Assembly resolution setting up talks, as happened with the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Alternatively, Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, who are the five nuclear weapon states recognized in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or a larger group of states possessing fissile material stocks or fissile material production facilities could launch ad hoc negotiations on a treaty.
(This post is based on the column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission terminated the license to construct the Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility, issued to Areva Enrichment Services in 2008. The termination was requested by Orano USA, successor to Areva. Areva suspended the project in December 2011 and abandoned the project shortly afterward (see the chronology of the project).
The launch of India's prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR), which was expected to reach criticality in mid-2018, has been delayed again, until at least 2019. The Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, in his statement at the 2018 IAEA General Conference in September said that "Our indigenously developed prototype fast breeder reactor of 500 MWe is now under going sodium commissioning. We expect criticality next year."