IPFM Blog

Austria and Norway published a working paper (PDF file) that summarized the discussions of the Second International Symposium on the Minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium that was held in Vienna on 23-25 January 2012, which Austria and Norway co-hosted together with the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Policy ideas and recommendations were summarized by the Symposium co-hosts as follows:

The following recommendations may not be universally shared by all the Symposium participants, but they reflect a possible policy agenda moving forward.

Minimization of highly enriched uranium

1. Continue to convert highly enriched uranium-based facilities and processes, remove material from as many countries and locations as possible and ensure the highest levels of security wherever these materials remain.
2. Finish the miniature neutron source reactor conversion process, recognizing that politically difficult locations make such activities challenging but also necessary.
3. Consider additional incentives for conversion and removal.
4. Establish an internationally agreed norm that low enriched uranium will be used in place of highly enriched uranium in any new facility or process under development, design or construction (including in possible new applications such as space reactors).
5. For facilities for which low enriched uranium fuels are not yet available, secure commitment to reduce enrichment below weapons grade and to the lowest level possible, until such time as low enriched uranium fuel can be qualified.
6. Develop an international, cooperative research and development programme to examine options for the management of spent fuel from newly developed low enriched uranium fuel types resulting from conversion efforts.
7. Encourage security requirements that correspond to material types and demonstrate where conversion to low enriched uranium assists in lowering security costs, in order to encourage conversion decisions.
8. Encourage members of IAEA to recognize and support the expertise and capacity of the Agency to further assist international endeavours for the minimization of highly enriched uranium.

Civilian naval propulsion reactors

1. Establish a global norm that low enriched uranium will be used in place of highly enriched uranium in any new nuclear-powered civilian vessels.
2. Phase out or convert existing civilian vessels fuelled by highly enriched uranium.

Transparency

1. Develop international standards or guidelines for public declarations of inventories of highly enriched uranium on a regular basis with consistent form and content.
2. Encourage the voluntary declaration of inventories of highly enriched uranium globally, and in particular, given the large quantities, the declaration of more highly enriched uranium to be in excess of military needs (including from naval programmes) and commit to blend down material declared to be in excess.
3. Promote and support independent efforts that add to public understanding of facilities and stocks.

Expansion of efforts

1. Expand the scope of conversion efforts to include critical assemblies and pulsed reactors.
2. Recognizing the challenges, begin a conversation on assessing inventory needs for ongoing use of highly enriched uranium in military vessels, and conduct a feasibility study to allow for possible low enriched uranium-based vessels for future generations of submarines and aircraft carriers.
3. Shift the focus of international dialogue from minimization of highly enriched uranium to the elimination of civilian uses of highly enriched uranium.

Frank Munger reports that the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory will continue to use HEU fuel until February 2020. Earlier, the conversion date for the reactor was set to September 2016, and earlier yet - to 2014. Explaining the delay, ORNL referred to the challenge of developing all-new high-density LEU fuel and budget constraints.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration signed an agreement with
the Morgridge Institute for Research "to further the development of accelerator-based technology to produce molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) in the United States without the use of proliferation-sensitive highly enriched uranium (HEU)." The $20.6 million agreement between NNSA and Morgridge involves an equal cost-share arrangement.

On 3 and 4 May 2012, IPFM is presenting a preliminary set of proposals on "Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material Stocks as a Step Toward Disarmament" at the First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, being held in Vienna.

The "Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament" agreed at the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference affirmed that "nuclear disarmament and achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons will require openness and cooperation, and ... enhanced confidence through increased transparency and effective verification."

To help inform this process, IPFM will offer a path for how NPT nuclear weapons states could fulfill their transparency commitments through a series of successively more detailed declarations of the numbers, status and histories of their nuclear warhead and fissile material inventories.

Idaho National laboratory will supply SCK-CEN, the operator of the BR2 research reactor, with low enriched uranium. According to the NRC license (XSNM3714, issued on 24 April 2012), INL will ship 4.40 kg of U-235, "contained in 22.0 kilograms uranium, enriched to 19.99 w/o maximum; alloyed with 7 - 10 weight percent molybdenum or unalloyed low enriched uranium; as fuel stock, plate or element form." The license specifies that the material will be used in "Irradiation Experiments in the BR-2 reactor."

The shipment is part of the European fuel development program, known as Leonidas, that includes testing of uranium-molybdenum fuels. In 2010, NRC approved a shipment of 93.5 kg of HEU to France to be used to manufacture fuel for the BR2 reactor. Earlier, NRC stated that HEU supply is conditional on development of LEU fuel for BR2.

Russia reportedly completed development of LEU fuel for the VVR-K research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. According to the report, the new fuel, VVR-KN, will allow to fully preserve operational parameters of the reactor. Reactor test of the new fuel assemblies are expected to begin in 2013. The fuel is being manufactured at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant. It could be used in other VVR-type reactors, in Russia and elsewhere.

The VVR-K reactor used HEU fuel with enrichment of 36%. In 2008-2009, the GTRI program assisted Kazakhstan with removing the reactor spent fuel to Russia. In 2011, the program helped Kazakhstan to eliminate the remaining HEU fresh fuel.

In March 2012 Ukraine reported completing removal of HEU from its territory, fulfilling the pledge made by the president of Ukraine at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Removal of HEU was done as part of the GTRI program that works on global HEU cleanout.

A small amount of HEU, however, remained in Ukraine - a report in Zerkalo Nedeli, a Ukrainian weekly, published the U.S.-Ukrainian Memorandum of Understanding (PDF in Ukrainian), which states that (translation from Ukrainian, emphasis added)

2. Ukraine undertakes to work together with the United States to

a) Carry out all necessary internal procedures in order to remove all the remaning HEU with the exception of a small amount of materials, as agreed by the Parties, which is sufficient for carrying out fundamental scientific research and for successful construction of the new LEU-based neutron source.

In the interview given to Zerkalo Nedeli, Ivan Karnaukhov, the director of the project that works on the construction of the neutron source mentioned in the memorandum - an accelerator-driven subcritical assembly - confirmed that some HEU remained at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, but did not disclose the amount.

This amount of HEU left in Ukraine appears to be very small, probably on the order of tens or a few hundred grams. A study done at the Argonne National Laboratory estimated that even if the assembly were to use HEU fuel, it would contain less than 1 kg of HEU (17 VVR-M2 fuel assemblies). Any amount of HEU left in Kharkov would be substantially less that that.

In a ceremony held at the Ship Building Complex Visakhapatnam, India formally commissioned Russian-built Nerpa submarine, known in India as INS Chakra, into the Indian Navy. The nuclear-powered attack submarine was handed over to India in March 2012.

The United States is reported to be shipping 186.4 kg of HEU (174 kg U-235) to France, where the material will be used to manufacture fuel for the High Flux Reactor (Réacteur à Haut Flux, RHF) at the Institut Max von Laue-Paul Langevin (ILL) in Grenoble. The material was supplied by the Y-12 National Security Complex, that requested the license (License Number XSNM3633) in March 2010. According to Tom Clements, nonproliferation policy director for the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, NRC granted the license on 16 March 2012.

Frank Munger of the KnoxNews.com, quotes the NNSA spokesman as saying that it is the last HEU shipment for the reactor at ILL. Since the late 1990s, France used Russian-supplied HEU to manufacture fuel for the RHF reactor. Russia, however, is unlikely to send more HEU to France.

At the time the application was made, it was planned that the material will be delivered in two shipments of about 80 kg each. The first was expected take place in 2010, the second - in 2012. However, since the license had not been granted until March 2012, the material is sent to France in one shipment.

Shipments of HEU for research reactor fuel are different from those covered by the recent agreement between Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and the United States to convert the medical isotope production in Europe to LEU.

UPDATE: The information about the date of shipment was updated.

UPDATE: According to Greenpeace France, the ship, Oceanic Pintail, which was in Charleston as of April 4, is expected to reach France in six days [i.e. around April 10]. The transfer of uranium is managed by Areva, which refused to comment on the details of the shipment. At the same time, NNSA is reported to insist that the uranium is already in France. It may have been transferred there by air.

The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs announced at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit that the Swedish government granted AB SVAFO, the national non-profit corporation responsible for nuclear waste management, a license to export "3.3 kilograms of plutonium and approximately 9 kilograms of natural and depleted uranium" to the United States. The license was granted on 2 February 2012. The transfer of the material will be done in the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

According to a statement published by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, most of the plutonium "was generated in Sweden and was primarily produced from fuel from the Ågesta reactor." The fuel was reprocessed in Mol, Belgium in 1969. The plutonium was stored in Studsvik "since 1970s" under IAEA and Euratom safeguards.

According to NNSA, the mission to transfer plutonium was initiated in 2009 an completed in 2012. See NNSA photo set of the mission. NNSA also reported that it was the first plutonium shipment under the GTRI program.