Fostering initiatives to reduce stocks and end the production and use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium
US Department of Energy announced that US company Centrus completed production of 900 kg of HALEU.
The company began HALEU production in October 2023 at its cascade of 16 centrifuges. The cascade was reported to be capable of producing 900 kg of HALEU annually. Centrus plans to increase the production of HALEU, including at a new cascade of 120 centrifuges.
Japan's Nuclear Reprocessing and Decommissioning Facilitation Organization (NuRO), responsible for the management of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, revealed a substantial increase in the cost of the facility. The construction cost is now expected to reach 3.7 trillion yen (about $25 billion). The total cost of the Rokkasho project, which includes the operating cost over 40 years as well as decommissioning, is expected to reach 15.6 trillion yen ($104 billion).
NuRO listed several factors that led to the cost increase:
NuRO also confirmed that the plant, constructed by the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL), is not expected to begin operations before the end of the 2026 fiscal year (end of March 2027). This decision was announced by JNFL in August 2024. It should be noted that the actual shearing and reprocessing operation is scheduled to start in the latter half of FY2027.
For background of the Rokkasho project, see the 2023 post by Tatsujiro Suzuki - "Japan's never ending reprocessing saga."
US administration issued a series of executive orders aimed at "reinvigorating the nuclear industrial base":
The executive orders contain a number of provisions regarding the production and management of fissile materials.
In particular, the "Reinvigorate" order directs the Department of Energy to explore ways to "maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear fuel through recycling, reprocessing, and reinvigorating the commercial sector." It also directs the government to provide a report that would evaluate of the reprocessing and recycling of spent nuclear fuel from DoD and DoE reactors. The report must also envision a possibility of transferring spent fuel to some "government-owned, privately operated reprocessing and recycling facility."
The "Reinvigorate" order terminated the surplus plutonium dilute and dispose program and establish instead "a program to dispose of surplus plutonium by processing and making it available to industry" for fuel in advanced reactors. The exception is made for the DoE's obligations to South Carolina, which calls for the removal of about 9.5 tonnes of plutonium from the Savannah River Site facility there. In 2016, the US Government approved the elimination of 6 MT of this material via the dilute and dispose route. The first shipment of this material was delivered to WIPP in December 2022. It appears that plutonium could also be removed from South Carolina via other disposition paths.
Regarding uranium enrichment, the executive order calls for the development of "a plan to expand domestic uranium conversion capacity and expand enrichment capabilities sufficient to meet projected civilian and defense reactor needs for low enriched uranium (LEU), high enriched uranium (HEU) and high assay, low enriched uranium (HALEU)." This requirement is largely in line with the policy of the Biden administration that supported the expansion of the domestic enrichment capacity and HALEU production in particular.
Global Laser Enrichment, US company that is commercializing the Silex laser enrichment technology, began large-scale demonstration testing at the Test Loop Facility located in Wilmington, North Carolina. GLE is quoted as saying that the testing program is expected to be a pivotal validation of large-scale enrichment performance under operationally relevant conditions. It is part of the TRL-6 validation that was expected to be completed in 2024.
Frank N. von Hippel
The Biden Administration allied with nuclear-power and climate activists in Congress to sustain nuclear power in the U.S. by subsidizing the operation of existing nuclear power plants, co-financing the construction of prototypes of small-modular reactors, and refurbishing and bringing back on line large power reactors that utilities had retired.
The administration also attempted to remove a political albatross hanging on the nuclear power industry's neck: the inability of the U.S. to site a deep underground spent fuel repository, by promoting research on spent fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycle. Previous Democratic administrations had opposed reprocessing since 1974, when India used plutonium separated with US assistance to test a "peaceful" nuclear explosive.
The Biden Administration also joined with the nuclear energy industry in promoting the production of "high-assay" low-enriched uranium (HALEU) to fuel some of the small modular reactors whose success it was betting on.
This post contains a summary of INFCIRC/549 reports by the countries that submit annual civilian plutonium declarations that reflect the status of civilian plutonium stocks as of 31 December 2023. The total amount of plutonium declared as civilian was about 374 tonnes, an increase of about 4 tonnes since the end of 2022. Only about 144 tons of this material are under international (IAEA or Euratom) safeguards. The other 230 tonnes are not safeguarded, but are covered by various obligations not to use the material for military purposes.
Japan (INFCIRC/549/Add.1-27) reported owning the total of 44.5 tons of plutonium, 8.7 tons of which is in Japan (the numbers in 2022 were 45.1 tons and 9.2 tons respectively). According to the Status Report on Plutonium Management in Japan - 2023 released in July 2024, out of the 35.8 tons of plutonium abroad, 21.735 tons are in the United Kingdom and 14.097 tons are in France.
Germany (INFCIRC/549/Add.2-27) reported having no separated plutonium in the country for the fourth year in a row. Germany does not report separated plutonium outside of the country. It is believed to be less than 1 ton.
Belgium (INFCIRC/549/Add.3-23) declared no separated plutonium in storage or at reprocessing plants and "not zero, but less than 50 kg" of separated plutonium in other categories. It reported that it had no foreign plutonium as of 31 December 2023.
Switzerland (INFCIRC/549/Add.4-28) reported having less than 2 kg of plutonium in the country (in the "located elsewhere" category). The number has not changed since 2016 (it was "less than 50 kg" in 2015).
France (INFCIRC/549/Add.5-28) reported having 110.7 tons of separated unirradiated plutonium in its custody. Of this amount, 14.45 tons belongs to foreign countries (a small increase from 14.33 tonnes in 2022). Almost all that plutonium - 14,097 kg - belongs to Japan. The amount of plutonium owned by France is 96.25 tons, an increase of 4.38 tons from previous year (91.87 tons).
The United States has not submitted its 2023 report as of 7 March 2025. It is likely that the numbers have not changed since 2022 and as a temporary measure these numbers are used to calculate the totals.
China has not has not submitted its 2017-2023 reports as of 7 March 2025. The last INFCIRC/549 report submitted to the IAEA showed 40.9 kg of separated plutonium as of 31 December 2016.
The United Kingdom has not submitted its 2023 report to the IAEA as of 7 March 2025. However, it released the information about civilian plutonium in the INFCIRC/549 format at the Office for Nuclear Regulation web site. According to these data, the United Kingdom owned 116.8 tons of separated plutonium, a small increase (or adjustment) from 116.4 in 2022. In addition to that, the United Kingdom stores 24.1 tons of foreign plutonium (of which 21.735 tons is owned by Japan and 1.58 tons by Italy). [UPDATE: The UK did submit its report, INFCIRC/549/Add.8-27 to the IAEA in September 2024. The Agency, however, only published it online on 11 June 2025.]
Russia (INFCIRC/549/Add.9-26) reported owning 64.9 tons of civilian plutonium, a small increase of 0.4 ton from 2022.
In addition to reporting plutonium stocks, some countries also submit data on their civilian HEU:
Germany reported 0.39 tonnes of HEU in research reactor fuel (0.35 tonnes in 2022), 0.94 tonnes of HEU in irradiated research reactor fuel, and 0.01 tonnes in the category "HEU held elsewhere."
France declared 5369 kg of HEU (5312 kg in 2022), of which 3801 kg (3761 kg) is unirradiated material - 573 kg (506 kg) of HEU at fuel fabrication or reprocessing plants, 51 kg (78 kg) at civil reactor sites, 3177 kg (3177 kg) at various research facilities. Also declared are 1551 kg (1533 kg) of irradiated HEU - 40 kg (62 kg) at civil reactor sites and 1528 kg (1511 kg) in other locations.
The United Kingdom reported having 691 kg of HEU (734 kg in 2022). Of this amount, 499 kg is unirradiated HEU (554 in 2022): less than 1 kg of unirradiated HEU is stored at the enrichment plants, less than 1 kg is at civil reactor sites, 412 kg - at fuel fabrication facilities, and 87 kg - at other sites (440 kg and 114 kg respectively in 2022). Irradiated HEU is located at civil reactor sites (5 kg) and other sites (132 kg).
The United Kingdom announced that the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority has taken ownership of "approximately 1.58 tonnes of separated civil plutonium" and "of approximately 700 tonnes of reprocessed uranium" that was previously owned by Italy. All this materials was already in the United Kingdom.
US Department of Energy filed a request with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the export license XSNM3847 to provide 100 g of 99% enriched HEU to Japan. The recipient is Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL).
In a statement released by the UK government on 24 January 2025, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero announced that it "will work with the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to immobilise the UK-owned civil separated plutonium inventory at Sellafield."
This announcement marked a shift in the UK approach to plutonium disposition. In 2011, the government made a preliminary decision to use the plutonium in MOX fuel, but also stated that it is open to other options. Immobilization was under consideration in 2015 (see the IPFM post), but no decision was made at the time.
As of the end of 2023, the United Kingdom had 140.9 tonnes of separated plutonium in its custody. Of this material, 24.1 tonnes belonged to other states, most of it - 21.735 tonnes - to Japan. The United Kingdom shut down the THORP plant that was reprocessing oxide-based fuel in 2018 and the Magnox plant in 2022.
On 25 January 2025 the European Council approved a new version of Commission regulation on the application of Euratom safeguards.
According to the EU, the changes will clarify and simplify the rules and also aligg the regulation "with technological progress and developments in the nuclear sector."