Tatsujiro Suzuki and Masa Takubo

On 11 May 2016, Japan's parliament passed a "Law Regarding Implementation of Reprocessing, etc. of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Generation" (our translation). The new law is to go into effect within six months. Its stated primary objective is to assure continued funding for reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication even if nuclear utilities go bankrupt after Japan's market for electric power is fully liberalized.

The new law amends the 2005 "Law regarding Deposit and Management of the Reserve Funds for Reprocessing, etc. of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Generation" and has three basic features:

1. It establishes the Spent Fuel Reprocessing Organization, a government-approved entity responsible for collecting funds required for reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication (Article 10.14; although the law provides for the possibility of multiple "Organizations," there will most probably be only one). This Organization will contract out actual reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication operations to Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL), which has built the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and is completing the adjacent MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility.
2. It requires Japan's nuclear utilities to pay "contributions" to the Spent Fuel Reprocessing Organization every fiscal year to cover the expected cost for reprocessing of all spent fuel they generated in the previous fiscal year and for turning the resulting separated plutonium into MOX fuel (Article 3.7). The contributions will be based on the amount of the electricity generated.
3. It requires that the Spent Fuel Reprocessing Organization's reprocessing plan be approved by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (Article 45), who is also responsible for approving the establishment of the Organization (Article 17).

The new law also has other several features that buttress Japan's commitment to plutonium separation:

1. It provides for the funding of reprocessing of all spent fuel and producing MOX fuel from all plutonium, while the previous law covered only the funding for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The funds that the utilities have voluntarily been setting aside for reprocessing spent fuel not to be dealt with by the Rokkasho plant will now be transferred to the Organization. This means that the new system will provide for a commercial reprocessing plant beyond Rokkasho, despite the fact that there currently appears to be no prospect for building another commercial plant.
2. The new law gives the government stronger authority over the reprocessing business. The purpose of the law is "steady implementation of reprocessing," making it possible for the government to force utilities to reprocess all their spent fuel.
3. Finally, the law forces Japan's utilities to continue separating plutonium regardless of future plutonium consumption plans. There is nothing in the law to enforce Japan's "no plutonium surplus policy."

Concerned about the inflexibility of the law and lack of consideration of Japan's plutonium balance, Japan's parliament added a required review of the law in three years instead of the five years originally proposed by the government and adopted a supplementary resolution that includes the following conditions:

1. When the situation changes, the government must review and take necessary measures, taking into account the views expressed during the parliamentary debate.
2. Direct disposal and spent fuel storage options must be developed to secure flexibility in spent fuel management. However the law which prohibits direct disposal of spent fuel remains in force.
3. Given Japan's stated commitment "not to possess plutonium without purpose for use," the Minister of METI shall not approve any reprocessing plan violating this principle.
4. Before approving a reprocessing plan, the Minister of METI must obtain the advice of Japan's Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC). JAEC is supposed to review the annual "plutonium usage plan" submitted by the utilities to check the balance of plutonium supply and demand before reprocessing takes place. However, the utilities have not submitted a new plan since 2010.
5. A scheme must be established to assess the implications and impacts of Japan's reprocessing program from a broad perspective, including taking into consideration its implications for international security.
6. The government must take stronger responsibility for enhancing spent fuel storage capacity and tackling the challenges concerning final disposal of high level waste.
7. Reprocessing should proceed with sincere dialogue with local communities to obtain understanding and cooperation. This condition is considered necessary as any change in the current reprocessing program may trigger opposition from Aomori prefecture, which hosts the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

These conditions, however, are not legally binding and it is not clear if they will be effective in establishing a balance between plutonium separation and use in Japan.