

101ST CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2403

To encourage negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to establish mutual and verifiable restrictions on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 18, 1989

Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. AU COIN, Mr. BATES, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. BOSCO, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. CAMPBELL of California, Mr. CLARKE, Mr. COELHO, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. DEFazio, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. EVANS, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. FRANK, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. McDERMOTT, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. MFUME, Mr. MINETA, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MOODY, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. NEAL of North Carolina, Mr. OBEY, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. PARKER, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. PENNY, Mr. RANGEL, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. ROYBAL, Ms. SCHNEIDER, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SHARP, Mr. SKAGGS, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. STARK, Mr. STOKES, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. TORRES, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. UDALL, Mrs. UNSOELD, Mr. WILLIAMS, and Mr. WOLPE) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services

A BILL

To encourage negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to establish mutual and verifiable restrictions

on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the "International Plutonium
5 Control Act".

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

7 The Congress finds and declares as follows:

8 (1) A mutual United States-Soviet ban on the pro-
9 duction of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for
10 weapons purposes would impose an additional con-
11 straint on a "break out" from arms limitation agree-
12 ments by making it more difficult to accumulate an in-
13 ventory of weapons-grade nuclear material, and thus
14 would strengthen mutual confidence between the su-
15 perpowers about the reliability of future nuclear arms
16 reduction agreements.

17 (2) Such a ban would also provide evidence to
18 non-nuclear weapon states of further progress in
19 United States-Soviet compliance with Article VI of the
20 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
21 which calls for negotiations on cessation of the nuclear
22 arms race at an early date.

23 (3) In view of the prospect of significantly reduced
24 nuclear arsenals in the future and the availability of

1 special nuclear material from dismantled weapons to
2 meet future stockpile requirements, the United States
3 and the Soviet Union should agree to forego further
4 production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium
5 for weapons purposes.

6 (4) A cutoff in the production of plutonium and
7 highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes is an es-
8 sential prerequisite for any long-term plan to verifiably
9 dismantle and reduce permanently nuclear warhead
10 stockpiles.

11 (5) Before the United States spends billions of dol-
12 lars to ensure the future safe operation of facilities to
13 produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for
14 weapons purposes, the United States and the Soviet
15 Union should jointly explore the feasibility of—

16 (A) a mutual shutdown of plutonium produc-
17 tion reactors, chemical separation facilities, and
18 isotope separation plants dedicated to the produc-
19 tion of plutonium for weapons purposes; and

20 (B) the safeguarded operation of uranium en-
21 richment and chemical separation facilities for
22 nonweapons purposes.

23 (6) National and cooperative technical means of
24 verification, and safeguards against the diversion of
25 weapon-grade nuclear materials from use in civilian

1 nuclear facilities to use in the production of nuclear
 2 weapons, would detect attempts by the United States
 3 or the Soviet Union to produce or divert significant
 4 quantities of the current stockpiles of these materials.

5 (7) An agreement between the United States and
 6 the Soviet Union to terminate production of plutonium
 7 and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes
 8 should be opened at the earliest possible date for signa-
 9 ture by other nations possessing nuclear weapons.

10 **SEC. 3. NEGOTIATIONS TO END PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM**
 11 **AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FOR**
 12 **NUCLEAR WEAPONS.**

13 The Congress urges the President to seek negotiations
 14 with the Soviet Union on a verifiable agreement for an end
 15 by both countries to the production of plutonium and highly
 16 enriched uranium for weapons purposes.

17 **SEC. 4. VERIFICATION.**

18 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
 19 and the Soviet Union—

20 (1) should establish verification arrangements to
 21 monitor the cessation of activities called for by this
 22 Act, including mutual inspections as necessary—

23 (A) of the production reactors, chemical sep-
 24 aration facilities, and isotope separation plants in
 25 each country that are dedicated to the production

1 of plutonium for weapons purposes in order to
 2 verify, for purposes of section 6, that the Soviet
 3 Union and the United States have ceased such
 4 production; and

5 (B) of the production reactors, chemical sepa-
 6 ration facilities, uranium enrichment facilities, and
 7 isotope separation plants in each country in order
 8 to verify compliance with the agreement called for
 9 in section 3;

10 (2) should furnish the technical equipment and
 11 personnel to implement safeguards at civilian nuclear
 12 facilities in each country, and should consider eventual-
 13 ly transferring the safeguards mission to the Interna-
 14 tional Atomic Energy Agency; and

15 (3) should consider increasing their respective con-
 16 tributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency
 17 to the level necessary to fund the assignment of addi-
 18 tional fully trained inspectors to each country to
 19 assume additional safeguards responsibilities at civilian
 20 nuclear facilities.

21 **SEC. 5. EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION.**

22 In furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the Congress
 23 urges the President to seek agreement with the Soviet Union
 24 that the United States and the Soviet Union will—

1 (1) exchange information on the location, mission,
2 and maximum annual capacity of their facilities essen-
3 tial to the production of tritium for stockpile replenish-
4 ment; and

5 (2) provide to each other a complete inventory of
6 the facilities dedicated to the production of plutonium
7 and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.

8 **SEC. 6. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM FOR NUCLEAR**
9 **WEAPONS.**

10 After the end of the 6-month period beginning on the
11 date of enactment of this Act, funds may not be obligated or
12 expended by the United States to operate a production reac-
13 tor, chemical separation facility, or isotope separation plant
14 dedicated to the production of plutonium for weapons pur-
15 poses unless the President, after the end of that 6-month
16 period, certifies to the Congress that—

17 (1) the Soviet Union has refused to enter in good
18 faith into the negotiations called for by section 3; or

19 (2) the United States is unable to determine that
20 Soviet production reactors, chemical separation facili-
21 ties, or isotope separation plants dedicated to the pro-
22 duction of plutonium for weapons purposes have ceased
23 operation; or

24 (3) the Soviet Union is continuing to obtain pluto-
25 nium by operating civilian chemical separation plants

1 that are not under bilateral United States-Soviet
2 safeguards.

3 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

4 For the purposes of this Act—

5 (1) the term “chemical separation plant dedicated
6 to the production of plutonium” means a facility that
7 separates fission products from plutonium contained in
8 reactor spent fuel and irradiated target assemblies;

9 (2) the term “production of plutonium and highly
10 enriched uranium for weapons purposes” does not
11 include—

12 (A) activities described in paragraph (3); or

13 (B) the operation of a uranium enrichment or
14 chemical separation facility under mutually agreed
15 safeguards to obtain—

16 (i) highly enriched uranium fuel for triti-
17 um production reactors and naval reactors,
18 or

19 (ii) plutonium for civil purposes;

20 (3) the term “production of plutonium for weapons
21 purposes” does not include activities conducted in con-
22 nection with the recycling of special nuclear material
23 from retired weapons and the recovery from scrap of
24 the existing weapon-grade plutonium inventory; and

1 (4) the term "isotope separation plant dedicated to
2 the production of plutonium for weapons purposes"
3 does not include pilot-scale facilities utilized exclusively
4 for the purpose of research and development.

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