STATEMENT BY

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At the Conference on Disarmament

Informal Discussions on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

General Exchange of Views

Geneva,
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Mr. Coordinator,

I congratulate you on your appointment as the Coordinator for informal discussions on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We have full confidence in your ability and diplomatic acumen for guiding our work. I assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation. We look forward to an interactive and substantive discussion based on the excellent work plan that you have prepared for this meeting.

Pakistan’s views on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are well known. I would, however, like to make it clear that Pakistan is not opposed to negotiating a Fissile Material Treaty per se. We are opposed to negotiating a treaty that only aims at a cut-off in future production of fissile material, without addressing existing stockpiles. This is because of the asymmetry of stocks in our region that has been compounded by the discriminatory civil nuclear cooperation agreements and NSG waivers. In such a situation, an FMCT would freeze the discriminatory status quo and confront Pakistan’s security with a permanent disadvantage.

A Fissile Material Treaty, on the other hand, would not only address the issue of asymmetry of stocks but would also constitute a genuine disarmament measure.

I would like to elaborate our position on the Fissile Material Treaty by sharing our views on some basic principles that should guide our deliberations. On substance, these principles must include:

i) **Equal and undiminished security for all states.** As recognized by the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to nuclear disarmament, SSOD-I of 1978, in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each state to security should be kept in mind and at each stage of the disarmament process the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. A treaty which overlooks or circumscribes the security of any state would not work.

ii) **Non-discrimination.** The treaty should neither discriminate between the different nuclear weapon states, nor between the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. All states parties should assume equal obligations without any preferential treatment.
iii) **Verifiability.** In order to be effective and credible, the treaty should provide a robust verification mechanism overseen by a representative and independent treaty body.

iv) **Disarmament objectives.** The treaty should make a genuine contribution towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and not merely be a non-proliferation instrument.

v) **Regional and global peace and security.** The treaty should promote both regional and global stability and enhance confidence among states parties.

In terms of **procedure:**

i) The treaty should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament which is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It strictly operates under the consensus rule to allow each member state to safeguard its vital security interests. A treaty that is negotiated outside this body, and without the consensus rule, will lack legitimacy and ownership.

ii) The lack of consensus on negotiating an FMCT based on the Shannon mandate should not prevent us from commencing negotiations on other core issues on the CD’s agenda including nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. And if consensus eludes us on negotiating any of the four core issues, as is the case currently, we should turn to the next best alternative of adopting a balanced and comprehensive Programme of Work that provides for substantive discussions on all agenda items. These discussions could evolve into formal negotiations when the circumstances permit, as was the case with CWC and CTBT.

As regards different aspects of a FMT, we believe that due consideration has to be given to the following issues:

i) **Scope**

The treaty should prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including reduction of existing stocks. Such a treaty would make a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament as well as to regional and global peace and security, by constraining both the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
ii) Definitions

The issue of definition is linked to the scope of the treaty. Any fissile material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons should be defined in the treaty. It should include enriched uranium and separated plutonium as well as neptunium and americium, or any other material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, for instance reactor-grade plutonium. The production and the use of fissile material so defined should be banned under the treaty, with the exception of material that is produced and used under safeguards for civilian peaceful purposes or for non-proscribed military activities.

iii) Verification

Pakistan would favour the so-called “comprehensive approach” whereby all nuclear material and facilities, and not just fissile material production facilities like enrichment and reprocessing plants, within the territory of states parties would become subject to full scope safeguards similar to the comprehensive safeguard agreements of the NPT non-nuclear weapon states. All fissile material produced prior to the treaty’s entry-into-force should be brought under safeguards. This should include material from retired warheads or those in the dismantlement queue, including such material already in waste disposal sites; material designated for civil purposes; excess material for military purposes; material for military non-proscribed activities; all material in unsafeguarded irradiated fuel both from power reactors and dedicated plutonium production reactors as well as separated reactor-grade Plutonium.

The verification of the treaty should come under the purview of an independent and dedicated treaty body – an FMTO – without excluding the use of IAEA resources. The responsibility to verify and oversee the treaty’s implementation cannot be assigned exclusively to the IAEA. The FMTO would need an executive body that includes all the major stakeholders on a permanent basis.

As regards the Legal and Institutional Aspects, we feel that it is premature to discuss these elements of the treaty, before reaching an agreement on its scope as well as the goals and objectives, definitions and verification.

We would elaborate on these issues in greater detail during the informal discussions.

I thank you, Mr. Coordinator.