The construction of the reactor began in 2004 and its operation has been delayed numerous times. In March 2023, the Department of Atomic Energy announced that the reactor will begin operations in 2024. Although core loading marks a significant step towards this goal, the date when the reactor is expected to achieve criticality has not yet been announced.
]]>In 2023, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) completed and may have started operating two large new centrifuge enrichment plants (CEP).
CNNC is operating three large centrifuge enrichment facilities that produce LEU for civilian purposes: Lanzhou (Gansu province, Plant 504), Hanzhong (Shaanxi province, Plant 405), and Emeishan (Sichuan province, the Emeishan civilian facility of Plant 814) (for more detail see: Hui Zhang, "China's uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling 2020-2040: current practices and projected capacities," in China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?). In 2023, CNNC added two new centrifuge enrichment plants (CEP) to these facilities: Emeishan CEP3 (i.e. Project 3 at Emeishan) and Lanzhou CEP5.
Emeishan CEP3
Satellite imagery taken in February 2015 shows early construction activities at Emeishan CEP3, including preparation for pad construction. The images also reveal that construction was suspended from at least February 2016. However, according to local government documents, construction resumed and continued from 2019 through 2022. Satellite images show that major construction work was completed around November 2021. According to Chinese sources, Emeishan CEP3 started trial production as early as January 2023, and was expected to begin normal operation around the end of 2023. Unlike the other two facilities at Emeishan, CEP1 and CEP2, which are equipped with first-generation centrifuges, CEP3 is believed to be using second-generation centrifuges. These have been operating at the Hanzhong plant 405 since 2017.
Emeishan CEP3 is believed to have a capacity of about 1.5-2 million SWU/year. Therefore, when combined with Emeishan CEP1 and Emeishan CEP2, which have a combined capacity of 2.2 million SWU/year, the total estimated capacity of the Emeishan enrichment facility has risen to approximately 4 million SWU/year. The image above, taken in May 2022, shows the layout of the facility (29.677314, 103.534625, Credit: CNES/Airbus, Google Earth).
Lanzhou CEP5
Construction activity at the main building of the Project 5 plant is visible in satellite images taken in late 2014. Other images also indicate that construction appeared to have been suspended in late 2015, but it resumed in the second half of 2022. The construction was apparently completed in early 2023, and according to Chinese sources, the Project 5 plant began initial operations around fall 2023. It is expected to start normal operations as early as the end of 2023.
As with Emeishan CEP3, Lanzhou CEP5 uses second-generation centrifuges and is estimated to have the total estimated capacity of 1.5-2 million SWU/year. Since the capacity of the other four plants at Lanzhou is about 2.6 million SWU/year, operations of Project 5 plant will bring the total capacity of Lanzhou plant to about 4.4 million SWU/year. The image above, taken in November 2022, shows the layout of the Lanzhou facility (36.148139, 103.523472, Credit: Maxar, Google Earth).
The table below describes individual plants at Emeishan and Lanzhou.
China's enrichment capacity
Taking into account the Hanzhong plant 405, which has a capacity of about 2.7 million SWU/year, China's total enrichment capacity is about 11 million SWU/year. This would be sufficient to provide enrichment services for the reactors with the total installed capacity of 70 GWe, which, according to the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), China is set up to achieve by 2025. Most of these reactors are light-water reactors, which are assumed to require about 130 tonne-SWU/year/GWe.
If China plans to bring its installed nuclear capacity to about 100 GWe by 2030, this will require an enrichment capacity of about 13 million SWU/year. It is anticipated that China will install about 2 million SWU/year or more during next Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). This expansion means that China will significantly increase its enrichment capacity. However, currently, it will primarily focus on servicing domestic demand.
]]>According to Chinese sources, China started up its first CFR-600 breeder reactor, running it at low power as of mid-2023. As of October 2023, the reactor had not yet been connected to the grid. The exact timeline for when it might begin generating electricity is unknown.
The reactor is the first of the two breeder reactors of this type built at Xiapu, Fujian province. The image above shows the reactor site (26.803567° 120.154710°) as of 23 December 2022.
Construction of the first unit began in 2017. At the time it was expected to begin operations in 2023, so the project is progressing according to the original plan. The initial core of the reactor is loaded with HEU fuel supplied by Russia. The first batch of fuel was delivered in 2022.
Construction of a second CFR-600 reactor at the same site started in 2020. This unit is expected to become operational in 2026.
]]>According to a Reuters report of 19 October 2023, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL) still hopes to finish construction of Japan's long-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing plant in the first half of FY 2024 (i.e. during April-September 2024). Already more than 25 years behind schedule, there are reasons to believe that this new announcement is just another wishful plan that will end with another postponement.
One indication of further possible delays is that on September 28, 2023, Naohiro Masuda, president of JNFL, stated that the safety review of the reprocessing plant by Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority will be difficult to complete by the end of the year 2023. He nevertheless insisted that the company could still meet completion target set as "by the end of the first half of FY 2024" (September 2024).
Here is a partial history of past key developments:
Why so many postponements?
There seem to be several underlying reasons for the postponements. First, JNFL lacks relevant expertise to manage such a technologically complex and hazardous project. It is owned by nine nuclear utilities plus all other major companies associated with nuclear power in Japan. Most of its senior executives are from shareholding companies (especially utility companies) and are not necessarily experts in the field of reprocessing.
Second, the technologies in the plant came from different companies and institutions. The management of the project is therefore technically complex.
Third, the post-Fukushima-accident nuclear facility safety licensing review process is much more stringent than before. For example, the Nuclear Regulation Authority told JNFL at their November 25, 2023 meeting:
JNFL should immediately make improvements because it is clear that JNFL does not understand the contents of the permit well enough to confirm the adequacy of the design of the facilities on site and has not visited the site.
Fourth, the financial costs to JNFL of postponement are covered by the utilities' customers because the utilities must pay a "reprocessing fee" every year, based on the spent fuel generated during that year, whether or not the reprocessing plant operates. The system by which the Nuclear Reprocessing Organization of Japan decides the reprocessing fee, is not transparent.
Fifth, the project lacks independent oversight. Even though JNFL's estimate of the cost of building and operating the Rokkasho plant has increased several-fold, no independent analysis has been done by a third party. One reason is that some of the shareholders are contractors themselves and have no incentive to scrutinize the reasons for the cost increases or the indefinite extension of the construction project.
After so many postponements, there is reason to wonder whether the plant will ever operate, but the government and utilities continue to insist that the plant will operate soon.
Even if Rokkasho were to operate, it may suffer from the same kinds of problems that marked Britain's light-water reactor spent fuel reprocessing experience, see the IPFM report Endless Trouble: Britain's Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) by Martin Forwood, Gordon MacKerron and William Walker.
Why does Japan's commitment to reprocessing continue?
There are four reasons:
Spent fuel management. Currently, most of Japan's spent nuclear fuel is stored in nuclear power plant cooling pools. But the pool capacities are limited and the 3000-ton-capacity Rokkasho spent fuel pool is also almost full. The nuclear utilities must therefore start operating the Rokkasho plant unless they can create additional spent fuel storage capacity, either on- or off-site. The Mutsu spent fuel storage facility is a candidate, but due to the concern that spent fuel could stay there forever, Mutsu city refuses to accept spent fuel unless the Rokkasho reprocessing plant begins to operate. The Rokkasho plant design capacity is 800 tons of spent fuel per year.
Legal and institutional commitments. Under Japan's nuclear regulations, utilities must specify a "final disposal method" for spent fuel. The law on regulation of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors states that "when applying for reactor licensing, operators must specify the final disposal method of spent fuel" (Article 23.2.8). In addition, there was a clause that "disposal method" should be consistent with implementation of the government policy, which specified reprocessing as the disposal method. Although that clause was deleted in the 2012 revision of the law after the Fukushima accident, the Law on Final Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste still bans direct disposal of spent fuel. In addition, the 2016 Law on Reprocessing Fees legally requires utilities to submit reprocessing fees for all spent fuel generated every year since they stated in their applications that "final disposal method" for their spent fuel would be reprocessing.
Commitments to hosting communities. The nuclear utilities committed - albeit tacitly - to the communities hosting nuclear power plants that they would remove the spent fuel to reprocessing plants, since that was the national policy. Separately, JNFL signed an agreement with Rokkasho village and Aomori prefecture that says that if the Rokkasho reprocessing plant faces "severe difficulties," measures will be considered including the return of spent fuel stored at Rokkasho to the nuclear power plants.
Local governments hosting nuclear power plants were not involved in this deal, however. They could therefore just refuse to receive spent fuel from Aomori.
In fact, after the Fukushima accident, when the government was considering amending the nuclear fuel cycle policy to include a "direct disposal option" for spent fuel in a deep underground repository, the Rokkasho village parliament (at the behind the scenes suggestion by the then JNFL president, Yoshihiko Kawai), issued a strong statement asking for "maintenance of the current nuclear fuel cycle policy."
The statement continued that, if Japan's fuel cycle policy changed, Rokkasho would: i) refuse to accept further waste from the reprocessing of Japan's spent fuel in the UK and France, ii) require the removal of reprocessing waste and spent fuel stored in Rokkasho, iii) no longer accept spent fuel, and should receive compensation for the damages caused by the change of the policy. This is an example how "local opposition" is often raised by the utilities and the government as a barrier to changing the reprocessing policy.
Institutional and bureaucratic inertia. Bureaucrats, who, in Japan, rotate to new positions every two or three years, are reluctant to take the risk of changing existing policies. They therefore tend to stick with past commitments. Institutional inertia becomes stronger as a project becomes bigger. The Rokkasho reprocessing project is one of the largest projects ever in Japan. Changing the project is therefore very difficult.
Will Japan's "plutonium capping policy" have any real impact?
In 2018, Japan's Atomic Energy Commission announced a new policy on "Basic Principles on Utilization of Plutonium" (see also the IPFM post). In the new policy, JAEC proposed that: 1) Japan would reduce its stockpile of separated plutonium starting with a commitment not to increase it, 2) Reprocessing would take place only when a credible plan to use the separated plutonium existed.
This policy, in conjunction with the new Reprocessing Fee Law, gives the government legal authority to control the pace of reprocessing. However, it is not clear how the "capping policy" will be implemented. It is not a legally binding document, and no regulation has been introduced to control reprocessing. Utilities must submit specific plans for plutonium use to the JAEC for its review before reprocessing of their fuel begins. But the JAEC can only give advice to the government about the credibility of these plans. There is therefore reason for concern that this policy may not be sustained. (A similar "paper rule" has existed since August 2003).
A way out
A way out of this situation would be:
Find additional spent fuel storage capacity, either on- or off-site. Local communities may be more willing to accept on-site dry cask storage of spent fuel, if they are told that it is safer than spent fuel pool storage. For example, Saga Prefecture and Genkai-town, which host Kyushu Electric's Genkai Nuclear Power Plant have agreed to host a dry cask storage that is to start accepting spent fuel in FY 2027. Host communities may want guarantees that spent fuel will be removed after a specified storage period. Such a guarantee could be given by the central government.
Amend the law on final disposal of high-level radioactive waste to allow direct disposal of the spent fuel in a deep underground repository. This would provide more flexibility in spent fuel management and make it easier for local communities to host interim spent fuel storage.
Amend the Reprocessing Fee Law to allow Reprocessing Fund to be used by the government to implement shutdown of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant including payment for JNFL's financial debt and for dry cask interim storage. This would enable the government to end the Rokkasho reprocessing plant project.
Additional resources
Tadahiro Katsuta and Tatsujiro Suzuki, Japan's Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges, Report of the International Panel on Fissile Material, September 2006.
Masafumi Takubo and Frank von Hippel, Ending reprocessing in Japan: An alternative approach to managing Japan's spent nuclear fuel and separated plutonium, Report of the International Panel on Fissile Material, November 2013.
Plutonium Separation in Nuclear Power Programs. Status, Problems, and Prospects of Civilian Reprocessing Around the World, Report of the International Panel on Fissile Material, July 2015.
Frank N. von Hippel and Masafumi Takubo, Banning Plutonium Separation, Report of the International Panel on Fissile Material, July 2022.
]]>As of the end of 2022, the total amount of separated plutonium both managed within and outside of Japan was approximately 45.1 tons, approximately 9.3 tons of which was held domestically and the rest of approximately 35.9 tons was held abroad.
The amount of domestic storage, 9.3 tons, hasn't changed since 2021. While about 0.6 tons were loaded into the Takahama Unit 4 reactor, approximately the same amount of plutonium fabricated into MOX fuel was transferred from France.
Of the plutonium stored abroad, 14,113 kg are stored in France (14,760 in 2021) and 21,757 kg - in the United Kingdom (21,780 in 2021). The reprocessing of Japan's spent fuel held in France had been completed by the end of 2017.
In 2021, Japan reported having a total of 45.8 tons of separated plutonium, of which 9.3 tons were held domestically.
]]>will provide an additional capacity of around 700 tonnes of SWU per year, a 15 per cent increase at UUSA, with the first new cascades online in 2025.
UUSA operates an enrichment facility in Eunice, New Mexico since 2010. The plant is licensed to produce LEU with enrichment of up to 5% (although UUSA has been exploring an option of producing HALEU with enrichment of up to 20%). The current capacity of the Eunice plant is reported to be 4900 tSWU/year. The original plan called for the capacity of 5700 tSWU/year.
URENCO is also considering expanding the capacity of the enrichment facility in Gronau, Germany.
]]>The HEU for the experiment will come from the Zero Power Physics Reactor facility at Idaho Lab, and the Department of Energy will retain ownership of the material. The MCRE is expected to be completed in six months.
]]>On 17 February 2023 Japan's Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) announced a new Plutonium Utilization Plan. According to the plan, Japan's eleven nuclear utilities will load mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel containing an average of 0.7 tons plutonium annually during FY 2023-2025 (0.7 tons in FY2023, zero in FY 2024, and 1.4 tons in FY2025, all at Takahama #3&4 operated by Kansai Electric Power Company). For the following two years, FEPC projects 2.1 tons of plutonium will be loaded in FY 2026 and 1.4 tons in FY 2027 but the reactors to be used are not specified.
FEPC has projected since 2020 that "about 6.6 tons/year [of plutonium will be loaded] by FY 2030," but its plans for the "next three years" have been delayed consistently since then. The goal of loading 6.6 tons of plutonium per year, which is highly unlikely to be achievable, would match the projected separation rate of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant operating at full capacity. That would put Japan's total stock of separated plutonium on a plateau, but its stock in Japan would increase dramatically if the plutonium loaded in MOX came primarily from Japan's stock of separated plutonium in France. As of the end of 2021, Japan's total stock of separated plutonium was 45.8 tons: 36.5 tons in Europe (21.80 tons in UK and 14.76 tons in France) and 9.3 tons in Japan.
For background, see Japan's Rokkasho reprocessing plant, 25 years behind schedule, delayed again. For the history of MOX fuel shipments and use by Japan, see Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Imports/Use/Storage in Japan.
]]>In December 2022, India's Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions & Prime Minister's Office--and the parliamentary spokesperson for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)--informed the upper house of the parliament that the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), of 500 MWe (megawatt-electrical) capacity, is now expected to be completed in 2024. Just nine months prior, on 31 March, the same spokesperson had offered 2022 as the year for completion.
As previously documented on this blog, completion of the PFBR has been repeatedly delayed. As a result, the construction period is now more than thrice the early projections. The DAE started building the PFBR in 2004. In 2005, less than a year after construction started, the director of the agency that designed the PFBR announced at a public meeting that he was "confident" that they would construct the reactor "in five years and a half", and that "four more FBRs, of 500-MWe capacity each, would be built... by 2020". With this latest delay, PFBR's project will be at least twenty years old.
The initial project cost estimate for the PFBR was 34.92 billion Rupees. That too has gone up in steps, and the last official update was in November 2019, when the same spokesperson informed the lower house of the parliament that the PFBR's projected cost was "being revised" to 68.40 billion Rupees. (As of 28 January 2023, the conversion rate for Indian Rupees is 81.5 per U.S. dollar but this has not been constant. However, the PFBR cost estimates are in mixed-year Rupees and so directly converting it into other currencies using one conversion rate would be misleading.) [UPDATE 2024-03-15: The cost has revised more recently to Rs. 76.70 billion.]
The other breeder reactor operating in India, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), managed to reach its "design power capacity of 40 MWt (megawatt-thermal)" only in 2022, thirty seven years after it started operating.
]]>Japan (INFCIRC/549/Add.1-25) reported owning the total of 45.8 tons of plutonium, 9.3 tons of which is in Japan (the numbers in 2020 were 46.1 tons and 8.9 tons respectively). According to the Status Report on Plutonium Management in Japan - 2021 released in July 2022, out of the 36.5 tons of plutonium abroad, 21.780 tons are in the United Kingdom and 14.760 tons are in France.
Germany (INFCIRC/549/Add.2-25) reported having no separated plutonium in the country for the second year in a row. Germany does not report separated plutonium outside of the country. It is believed to be less than 1 ton.
Belgium (INFCIRC/549/Add.3-21) declared no separated plutonium in storage or at reprocessing plants and "not zero, but less than 50 kg" of separated plutonium in other categories. It reported that it had no foreign plutonium as of 31 December 2021.
Switzerland (INFCIRC/549/Add.4-26) reported having less than 2 kg of plutonium in the country (in the "located elsewhere" category). The number has not changed since 2016 (it was "less than 50 kg" in 2015).
France (INFCIRC/549/Add.5-26) reported having 99.9 tons of separated unirradiated plutonium in its custody. Of this amount, 15 tons belongs to foreign countries. It appears that almost all that plutonium - 14,760 kg - belongs to Japan. The amount of plutonium owned by France is 84.9 tons, an increase of 5.4 tonnes from previous year (79.5 tons).
In its 2021 report (INFCIRC/549/Add.6-24) declared 49.4 tons of separated plutonium, of which 4.6 tons are in MOX fuel and 44.8 tons are "held elsewhere" (most of this material is believed to be in weapon components). This amount was reported to be 44.7 tons in 2018, but went back to 44.8 tons in 2019 (as indicated by the "previous year" number in the 2020 declaration). These changes appear to reflect changes in the accounting for the material - the amount reported as "disposed as waste" was 4.6 tons in 2018, but was reverted to 4.5 tons in 2020.
China has not has not submitted its 2017-2021 reports as of 27 January 2023. The last INFCIRC/549 report submitted to the IAEA showed 40.9 kg of separated plutonium as of 31 December 2016.
The United Kingdom (INFCIRC/549/Add.8-25) reported owning 116.5 tons of separated plutonium, an increase from 116.1 in 2020. In addition to that, the United Kingdom stores 24.1 tons of foreign plutonium (of which 21.780 tons is owned by Japan).
Russia (INFCIRC/549/Add.9-24) reported owning 63.5 tons of civilian plutonium, an increase of 0.1 tons from 2020.
In addition to reporting plutonium stocks, some countries also submit data on their civilian HEU:
Germany reported 0.35 tonnes of HEU in research reactor fuel, 0.94 tonnes of HEU in irradiated research reactor fuel, and 0.01 tonnes in the category "HEU held elsewhere." None of the numbers have changed since 2020.
France declared 5313 kg of HEU (5319 kg in 2020), of which 3760 kg (3785 kg) is unirradiated material - 804 kg (852 kg) of HEU at fuel fabrication or reprocessing plants, 60 kg (74 kg) at civil reactor sites, 2896 kg (2859 kg) at various research facilities. Also declared are 1553 kg (1533 kg) of irradiated HEU - 62 kg (79 kg) at civil reactor sites and 1491 kg (1454 kg) in other locations.
The United Kingdom reported having 734 kg of HEU (737 kg in 2020). Of this amount, 598 kg is unirradiated HEU (601 in 2020): less than 1 kg of unirradiated HEU is stored at the enrichment plants, less than 1 kg is at civil reactor sites, 420 kg - at fuel fabrication facilities, and 178 kg - at other sites (421 kg and 180 kg respectively in 2020). Irradiated HEU is located at civil reactor sites (5 kg) and other sites (132 kg).
]]>The shipment begins the implementation of the DoE "dilute and dispose" program. The program, approved in 2016, is authorized to dispose up to six tons of excess plutonium that is stored at the Savannah River Site in oxide by mixing it with an engineering substance, known as "stardust," and placing it in WIPP. In the FY2021 budget request, US administration envisioned that plutonium will be disposed at a rate of about 1.5 tons a year. For FY2022, Congress approved the request of $156 million to build glovebox capacity at SRS.
In December 2016, then U.S. Secretary of Energy announced that the United States will begin consultations with the IAEA "to monitor the dilution and packaging of up to six metric tons of surplus plutonium at the Savannah River Site." However, there are no indications that the IAEA was involved in the December 2023 shipment.
]]>On 26 December 2022, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited announced another delay in completion of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. The plant is already 25 years late; completion was originally scheduled for 1997 (in 2020 the startup of the plant was delayed until 2022). It is now projected to be completed in mid-2024 with plutonium-separation operations to begin a year later. The delays are significant for the accumulation and use of separated plutonium in Japan.
According to Japan's Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC), if and when the reprocessing plant operates at its design capacity of 800 tons of spent fuel per year, it will separate 6.6 tons of plutonium annually. This could lead to a rapid increase of Japan's stock of separated plutonium, which amounted to 45.8 tons as of the end of 2021: 36.5 tons in France and UK and 9.3 tons in Japan.
Between 1969 to 2001, Japan's utilities sent about 7100 tons of spent LWR and gas-cooled reactor fuel to France and the UK for reprocessing - originally to obtain startup plutonium for Japan's then-planned fleet of plutonium breeder reactors. About 45 tons of plutonium were separated from this fuel. Following the 1995 sodium fire at the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor, however, Japan's breeder-reactor program was delayed indefinitely.
To assure that Japan's plutonium accumulating in Europe and to be separated at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant would be used in fuel, FEPC announced in 1997 that, by 2010, 16-18 Japanese light-water-cooled power reactors (LWRs) would be loading 7-11 tons of plutonium annually in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. As of the end of 2021, however, Japan's LWRs have used an average of only 0.2 tons of plutonium per year and cumulatively only 4.7 tons since MOX fuel for LWRs was first shipped to Japan from France and the UK in 1999.
In 2018, in an attempt to allay international concern about the size of Japan's stock of separated plutonium, Japan's Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) issued a policy statement that Japan's stock of separated plutonium held in Japan and abroad would not increase from its then level of 46.6 tons (see also this IPFM blog post). Thus far, this policy objective has been realized - but only because of the continued delays in the startup of Japan's reprocessing plant.
Between JAEC's 2018 declaration that Japan's stock of separated plutonium would not increase and the end of 2021, Japan's utilities used about 1.2 tons of plutonium in MOX fuel in four LWRs at an average rate of about 0.35 tons/year. (For the history of MOX fuel shipments and use by Japan, see Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Imports/Use/Storage in Japan.)
In 2020, FEPC revised its 2009 goal of 16-18 reactors using MOX by 2015 downwards to 12 reactors by 2030. In FEPC's February 2022 update of its plutonium use plan, it announced that 0.7 tons/year will be used during FY 2022-2024, 1.0 ton in FY 2025, 2.1 tons in FY 2026, and about 6.6 tons/year by FY 2030. The last would match the projected separation rate of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant operating at full capacity.
Signs of trouble to this plan were immediately observed, however. Chubu Electric announced an indefinite delay in its plan to introduce MOX into its Hamaoka #4, followed by J-Power's announcement of another delay in the start date of its under-construction Ohma reactor - this time until fiscal year 2030. The Ohma reactor carries great weight in Japan's plutonium use plans because, unlike other Japanese reactors, which are limited to one third or less MOX fuel in their cores, it is a high-powered reactor designed to use a full MOX core. It will take 5 to 10 years to ramp up to a full core, however, with a planned loading rate of 1.7 tons of plutonium per year.
In 2010, construction began on a MOX fuel production plant next to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. As of 26 October 2022, however, the plant was only 9.4% complete. Although the current announced plan is to start operation of the MOX plant by the end of September 2024, that date too will likely be delayed. If the reprocessing plant operates but the MOX plant does not, separated plutonium will accumulate at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
Japan has almost 22 tons of plutonium stranded in the UK as of the end of 2021. The UK's MOX plant was shut down permanently in 2011, after 10 years of failed attempts to operate it. Japan's government has not yet officially responded to the UK government's 2011 offer to dispose of that plutonium for an agreed price with the UK's own 116.5 tons (as of the end of 2021) .
On the other hand, use of Japan's plutonium in France, where there is an operating MOX plant, is going slowly. Japan's utilities have begun trading plutonium to facilitate the use of this plutonium, amounting to almost 15 tons as of the end of 2021. Shikoku Electric and Kyushu Electric, which have almost used up their plutonium stocks in France, have a combined total of 2.5 tons in the UK. They plan to transfer the ownership of that plutonium to Tokyo Electric Power Company in exchange for TEPCO plutonium in France that TEPCO cannot use.
The challenge remains, however, of disposing of Japan's existing stock of 45.8 tons plus the 6.6 tons/year to be separated at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant if and when it operates at full capacity. This challenge could be made much more manageable and less costly to Japan's utilities if completion and operation of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant were cancelled. For reasons it has never adequately explained, however, cancellation still appears unthinkable for Japan's government.
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